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GERMANY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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GERMANY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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The United States and the Federal Republic are allies in NATO because the governments of these two countries consider the Western alliance to be of value in the pursuit of their respective political interests. The alliance is not based on popular sentiment, cultural affinity, or historical tradition.

Many Americans "like" the Germans, admire certain outstanding writers, composers, or scientists of German nationality, and hold certain German political leaders in high regard. There are other Americans, however, who are attracted rather to Englishmen or Frenchmen or Poles.

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Furthermore, for every German who deplores the absence of nightingales in the United States or is bewildered by the American ability to temper the moralistic with the pragmatic in politics, you can find an American who dislikes what he takes to be the German propensity to march rather than walk or to love obedience as well as music. But neither such Germans nor such Americans bear witness against the worth of the alliance. Foreign policy cannot be shaped by sentiment or resentment.

NATO is not sustained by expectations or expressions of gratitude for American assistance rendered in the early postwar years to Western Europe at large and West Germany in particular. Nor is the functioning of NATO necessarily impeded by resentments of alleged hegemonic aspirations that some people even outside the communist camp attribute to the United States, others to France, and still others to a new generation of Germans. Such resentment becomes politically relevant only if it reinforces a government's decision to leave or weaken an alliance, judging it no longer to serve the purpose for which it was formed. In the case of NATO this purpose has been the protection of common security interests against hegemonic designs of the Soviet Union. Who is bold enough to act on the assumption that these designs have vanished?

As to cultural affinity, American bonds with Europe at large and Germany in particular are, of course, closer than they are with Asian or African nations, because in DeGaulle's words, America is "the daughter" of Europe, but by no means all Americans believe that they owe a greater

cultural debt to Germany than to France, and if they read the Bible, it is in the King James version and not in Luther's translation.¹ But cultural affinity between allies is no essential source of political solidarity -- in art, if not in baseball, the Japanese are closer to the Chinese than to the Americans -- and no alliance can be built on similarities of "national character," say, love for children or the capacity for inflicting unintentional, and hence ungentlemanly, insults on foreigners.

Finally, "fate" or "history" -- favorite German entities -- do not pre-destine any nation to be the ally of another nation. Today, neither Franco-German "friendship" nor the still rather cold climate in Russian-American relations follows a historical precedent. The United States has never been at war with Russia, while Frenchmen have often met Germans in

¹ Similarly, the West Germans feel "culturally" closer to France than to the United States, but the majority of Germans today consider cooperation with the United States on political, economic, and military matters to be more important than they regard such cooperation with France. An Allensbach survey taken in June 1965 found the following distribution of preferences:

Who Is More Important to Germany?
(With whom should Germany cooperate more closely?)

With regard to:	U.S.	France	Undecided	Total
1. Culture (education and art)	26	37	37	100
2. Reunification	64	8	28	100
3. Economics	58	20	22	100
4. Armament and Defense	63	11	26	100

Cf. Erich Peter Neumann, "Probleme unseres Frankreich-Bildes," Die politische Meinung, September 1965, p. 28.

It should be added, however, that such figures provide no guidelines for policy, but are in large part volatile public reactions to the prevailing

battle. Alliances change with the changing constellation of national interests and appear to be fairly independent of similarities in the forms of government or in the ideologies to which the people in the countries concerned are accustomed. Just as in the alignment during the Thirty Years War, the Protestant-Catholic schism was superseded by the political interests of states and principalities, so in World War II the conflict between communism and capitalism receded in the face of Hitler's initial military victories, and in the postwar world, victors and vanquished in the West formed an alliance to guard against the communist peril.

Since political interests are the root of the defensive alliance, it follows that the coalition is likely to break up if one or more of the following estimates of the international situation come to prevail in government councils:

- (1) the rationale of the alliance has disappeared, i.e., the common danger of aggression is judged to have passed;
- (2) the means and arrangements for meeting such aggression are judged to be inadequate and no agreement on repair or reform can be reached;
- (3) as circumstances change, one or more members of the alliance conclude, or come to be persuaded, say by foreign governments or by the domestic opposition, that the alliance invites rather than deters aggression and harms rather than serves national interests;
- (4) the burdens of the alliance are judged to be inequitably distributed among the members of the alliance;
- (5) the European allies develop a capability to defend themselves without U. S. aid.

To these five conditions must be added a sixth. The alliance will falter if the national policy of one or more of

its members is judged by the others to conflict with the common purpose of the alliance. The seriousness of such intra-alliance conflict decreases with the power of the member state that causes it, and it increases with the power of the member state that is annoyed by the conflict. For example, if the United States became critically dissatisfied with its allies this would almost certainly spell the doom of NATO, while the dissatisfaction of France need not necessarily be disastrous, no matter how disturbing it is. Were NATO judged to be no longer serviceable to the common interests of its member states, each government would eventually face the question as to whether reform and repair are desirable and feasible -- what specific compromise is acceptable? -- whether selective bilateral arrangements should be substituted for those institutions and organizational features of the alliance which no longer command common support, or whether the complete restoration of freedom from the entangling alliance is the preferred course of action.

In examining the viability of a coalition one should not search for identity of national interests, but for compatibility. The national interests of the Federal Republic and of the United States are neither identical in scope nor equal in weight, nor do all of them point to the same objective; but for almost twenty years, Germany's interests and some American interests in foreign affairs have nevertheless been such as to help to create and sustain an alliance between the two countries -- thus far mainly within the framework of NATO.

In the following observations on the place of Germany in current U. S. foreign policy,¹ I shall leave aside economic considerations and refer only

¹These observations are part of a larger study that I am undertaking for the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and do not represent the views of The RAND Corporation or any other organization.

to three points: (1) the American orientation toward political order in Europe; (2) the global character of American interests; (3) American nuclear policy.

In all three regards German interests differ in varying degrees from American interests; this is to be expected. Unlike the United States, the Federal Republic is neither a global power nor a nuclear power. Moreover, despite its swift political and social resurrection from the ashes of World War II -- a performance more impressive than the development of the West German economy -- the Federal Republic lacks the fullness of sovereignty which the other member states of NATO enjoy. This fact is closely associated with the outcome of World War II and the division of the country into two parts, each with a regime hostile to the other.

Apart from being a continental European power like France, and not a power with global interests like the United States or Great Britain, and apart from being a non-nuclear power, like Italy, the Federal Republic has certain other political characteristics that bear upon its position within the alliance. Its borders are more vulnerable to communist encroachment than are those of the other West European NATO powers. Secondly, it is interested in the reunification of Germany and thus in a change of the territorial status quo in Europe; this interest is appreciated by its allies, but for evident reasons it is of greater importance to Germany than to her allies. In addition, her biggest industrial city, West Berlin, is isolated from both West Germany and East Berlin, a walled-up torso of a Western capital surrounded by communist territory. Thirdly, of all NATO powers the Federal Republic contributes the largest contingent to the conventional defenses of the alliance. Finally,

as a vanquished nation now allied with some of its victors, the Federal Republic still lives with some constraints on its sovereignty and cannot yet afford to forget that its predecessor was Hitler's Reich. In order to realize that the past still burdens the present, one needs only to recall the crisis in the Near East early in 1965 or the more recent international debates on halting the spread of nuclear weapons and on a joint nuclear force. In spite of the economic strength of the Federal Republic and its considerable military contribution to NATO, few tactical and strategic options are open to the foreign policy of West Germany. This is true whether one looks at German foreign policy in relation to other powers in Eastern Europe or the Near East, in Western Europe or North America, in Africa or Asia. And it is true whether one looks at the initiative German foreign policy might take or the way in which it can respond to the initiatives of other powers.

II

U. S. postwar foreign policy still bears the marks of the grand strategy of World War II. The last World War was fought in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas with the two theaters competing for primary attention and preferential allocation of American and British resources in arms and . The most important decision concerning the grand strategy of the war was that determining the priority of the European theater. This decision influenced the course and phasing of World War II to Churchill's satisfaction, and occasionally, to MacArthur's chagrin.

After the war, Europe remained the primary theater of the political, economic, and military engagement of the United States, although all the fighting in which Americans have participated since the end of World War has occurred not in Europe.

The American postwar policy of containment in Europe has served the same interests which prompted the United States to participate in two world wars: for strategic and economic reasons the United States cannot allow Europe to fall under the domination of any single power, whether this power be Germany or Russia. In my view, the United States would also have to oppose a domination of Europe by a combination of powers, say a Russo-French or a Russo-German alignment, although in 1940 the United States would almost not have objected if the French government had accepted Churchill's bid to join undefeated Great Britain with moribund France. Far-sighted Germans, like Chancellor Adenauer, have always been concerned about the consequences which another "Kronstadt" or a German movement toward another "Rapallo" might have for the international position of the Federal Republic.

At Yalta President Roosevelt told Stalin that American troops would be withdrawn from Europe within two years after the termination of fighting, but when the American hope for continued Soviet-American collaboration after the end of the war turned out to be ill-founded, the United States made the most radical break in the history of its foreign policy. It decided to abandon its time-honored tradition of avoiding entangling alliances in peacetime. It assisted Western Europe economically; it helped to form NATO; it

stationed large forces in Europe, and it encouraged European unification.

The United States interest in the formation of NATO was four-fold:

(1) It wanted to prevent an expansion of the communist domain into the non-communist part of Europe in order to deny these territories to communist political domination and economic and military exploitation. (2) It wanted the powers whose vital security interests were at stake to share the burden of defense so that the United States would not carry this burden alone for allies that would apply their resources to increasing their comfort at American expense. (3) It wanted to organize the defense of free Europe in such a way that this relatively small part of the continent could be held at the beginning of the war and would not have to be reconquered at the end, as had been necessary in World War II. (4) It wanted to prevent a German "Drang nach Osten."

Moreover, the task of defending Western Europe in the nuclear age impressed upon military planners the need to take account of the shrinkage of distance and time brought about by the development of long-range vehicles capable of delivering nuclear warheads on military targets and cities, on ports and beachheads. In the two world wars, the United States had mobilized for war after the outbreak of hostilities: America was protected by oceans and friendly powers. In the initial years of these wars -- until 1917 and 1941, respectively -- the brunt of the battle was borne by these powers friendly to the United States. In World War II even the decision to exact the unconditional surrender of the enemy was made long before a single American soldier set foot on European soil.

In a future world war the United States would have no time to mobilize its strength after the opening of hostilities in Europe. Nor would the West European powers of NATO be in a position to absorb a massive military onslaught in the hope that in the end the United States would join the battle to turn the tide. By that time, little would be left of what we now know of Western Europe. Khrushchev once remarked that not even the Acropolis would be spared. The Soviet leaders, in turn, cannot risk making war in stages against the West if they must count on U. S. resistance from the very beginning. Regardless of the musings of some Europeans about the "incredibility" of the U. S. deterrent, the Soviet leaders cannot afford to discount the hazard of having to contend in a war against Europe with the overwhelming might of the United States as well.

The alliance to be serviceable in the nuclear age as a deterrent cannot rely on concepts and schedules of mobilization that were sufficient in the pre-nuclear age. It must have in peacetime integrated forces, a command structure that is not rendered ineffective by time-consuming political consultation during battle; it needs adequate logistical and warning systems. Its forces must be so deployed, so armed, and so instructed as to be capable of timely concerted, defensive action.

West German forces were integrated into NATO not only for reasons of creating a more effective defense against the East, but also in order to safeguard against the resurgence of German national military power. West Germany's integration into the alliance has been of considerable benefit to

her. NATO has assured her of a considerable measure of security, and NATO membership has made possible her political rebirth as one of the Christian and democratic states of Western Europe. In addition, West Germany has received assurances from her allies that they consider the Federal Republic as the only legitimate German government and seek Germany's reunification by peaceful means, that is, by negotiations with the leaders of the Soviet Union, the four-power responsibility for German reunification never having been abandoned. The Federal Republic, in its turn, obligated itself to its allies not to produce any ABC-weapons and certain other types of arms; nor can it withdraw any of its contingents from NATO, as other members of the alliance have done on several occasions. It is unlikely that West Germany would today enjoy allied support for reunification had it not been for the German decisions to participate in the common defense and in West European institutions like the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and the Common Market.

NATO has been an effective deterrent to Soviet expansion in Europe. When we speak of the deterrent having been successful we generally think of success in keeping the peace. We should, in fact, be thinking more specifically of the success in controlling the escalation of political conflict. The use of military power is not confined to war, and the peacetime, political worth of deterrent power needs to be appreciated in operational terms. Such power is an instrument in conditions of acute conflict or in "crisis management" -- if one prefers the new, inept term of political analysts. In U. S.

postwar history the militarily significant operations in the resolution of European crises have included augmentations of deployed military power and sudden expansions of the military budget (during the second Berlin crisis in 1961), improvisations like the airlift and the redeployment of strategic bombers from the United States to Great Britain (in the first Berlin crisis); further, they have included putting certain naval forces and SAC on alert status on several occasions; they have also included efforts to persuade Western allies to agree on contingency plans for the defense of Berlin. All this has taken resources, resilience, and resolution, as well as restraint. It is worthwhile reflecting on what might have happened had a smaller power, or even a combination of smaller powers, been faced with the task of deterring the intensification of political crises.

III

American policy has not only helped to form NATO but has also favored the political unification of Western Europe. Clearly, the United States is interested in preventing another war arising from intra-European conflicts: a united Europe would be pacified. Furthermore, American experience sustains the belief that a large politically integrated area, rather than a divided one, offers the best prospects of economic growth. Although American concern with the viability of the West European economy has not been entirely altruistic -- what policy ever is? -- this concern stemmed originally from the desire to strengthen common Western resistance to Communist subversion and aggression. More recently, the United States has also wished that Europe

assume a share of "the global responsibility" which the United States discharges through military and economic assistance in decolonized areas of the world.

Many Americans are aware of the fact that the United States spends a higher percentage of her GNP for national security than does West Europe, which spends relatively more than the United States on social security. But not all Americans take due account of the fact that burden-sharing outside the NATO area presupposes a unity of political purpose among the allies which has never been strong -- witness Suez 1956; and it has progressively dwindled even within the alliance organization, as Europe has recovered her economic strength. Nor have all Americans given due consideration to the fact that in the process of decolonization some of the powers that are now expected to support U. S. policy outside Europe and engage themselves economically in Asia and Africa were not discouraged by the United States from divesting themselves of political responsibilities in these parts of the world.

Finally, the many American arguments in favor of European unity include one advanced on grounds of administrative convenience. It found expression in President Kennedy's yearning for "an opposite number" in Europe so that he would be spared troublesome multilateral negotiations with many European statesmen, none of whom could claim to be speaking for Europe. He said,

There is no "Europe." I understand their objection to my speaking for them on nuclear matters, but who's to be my opposite number? I can't share this decision with a whole

lot of differently motivated and differently responsible people. What one man is it to be shared with -- DeGaulle, Adenauer, McMillan? None of them can speak for Europe.¹

In my view, which is not shared by many Americans, it is puzzling that U. S. policy has hardly ever been troubled by doubt that a united West Europe would be in the American interest. The U. S. government has not been deeply concerned with conceivable contingencies in which it would be more difficult for the United States to reconcile its national interests with those of a federal European state than it has been to reach such reconciliation with several sovereign states in a divided Europe. Instead, Americans believe that once Europe were united American-European relations would be blessed with pre-established harmony. This admirable faith springs from a variety of national experiences, certain deeply-rooted convictions about the moral nature of friends and the immoral nature of adversaries, and from unwillingness to suffer from history in the belief that one can make the future. In a skeptical mind this faith may invoke memories of the American dream about One World: as long as the peace of One World is unattainable, perhaps One Europe recommends itself, among other things, as a step toward that distant goal. It may be recalled that President Kennedy once solemnly stated that he was not seeking a Pax Americana.²

¹Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, New York, 1965, p. 509.

²Speech at American University in Washington, June 10, 1963, The New York Times, June 11, 1963.

Although there are considerably worse forms of peace he thought about a better one.

Whatever the reason for U. S. policy in support of European unification, attributing hegemonic intention to the American Grand Design is the result of misunderstandings. I do not think that any Grand Design -- whether Kennedy's or DeGaulle's -- is likely to be established in the foreseeable future, but if Kennedy's were realized, it would not be in execution of American hegemonic intent, nor could it fail to reduce American influence in European affairs.

Although not inspired by hegemonic aspirations American policy toward Europe reflects, of course, the preponderance of American military power in the alliance. Moreover, while Washington in its support for the political unification of Europe has been far-sighted, it has shown more enthusiasm than discretion. Encouraging the European governments to abandon or restrict their sovereignty in order to form a European super-state, Washington has misjudged the strength of national consciousness and pride in Europe. It has misjudged the offense that even the strong who are benevolent give to the weak, when the latter rightly believe that they themselves are growing stronger and rightly or wrongly judge the need for protection by the strongest to be waning. As a nation that is fond of engineering Americans may have been blinded to the sensibilities of Europeans by the vision of a future, in which centuries of history were swept away like clutter on a drawing board.

American policy toward Europe after World War II learned from the mistakes it made after World War I, but it gave President DeGaulle above all others many opportunities for reminding Americans that their interest in continental unification encounters in Europe the reestablished preeminence of nation states. Only in Germany the nation state was shattered by defeat, truncation and division. Besides, like Italy, Germany had existed as a unified state only for a rather short time prior to World War II. Following defeat, even German nationalists like Ernst Jünger advocated the absorption of the country into a promising New Europe, about twenty years after the Social Democrats who had favored the unification of Europe as early as 1925, in their Heidelberg Program. For the Federal Republic there has been only gain in a united Europe: it is not by chance that the unification of Europe as well as the reunification of Germany are signposts of the future solemnly mentioned in the Preamble to the Basic Law of the land.

But political order in Western Europe, if not to be based either on balance of power or on hegemony, presupposes political cooperation of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic, and neither Great Britain nor France have been eager to become parts of a federal European state. Even proposals for less radical changes that in time might lead to a confederation of sovereign states have encountered strenuous opposition in several medium and small European states. Thus, it is only realistic not to entertain high hopes that the unification of Europe will soon be attained. Economic integration does not automatically lead to political integration.

Organizational contrivances for purposes of common defense, like the MLF, rather than promoting unity either obscure or exacerbate the political problems they are designed to solve. And nationalism does not seem to be a spent force in Europe any more than it is in other parts of the world. Americans tend to regard national self-assertion as a natural, as well as a desirable, development, provided it occurs in Eastern Europe, because there it aims at liberty rather than aggrandizement. Instances of national self-assertion in Western Europe are often judged to be undesirable since they are suspected of being aimed at aggrandizement rather than liberty. European claims that national self-assertion serves liberty, i.e., freedom from American predominance, render such nationalism not only undesirable, but also "unnatural," since everyone is presumed to understand that history has relegated nationalism to the museum of obsolete passions and no one of good will is presumed to confuse the objective predominance of the United States in NATO with an intent to rule over Europe.

The Federal Republic is caught in a dilemma. Both its vital security interests and its interests in reunification force Germany to seek the closest possible relations with the United States in NATO. If NATO were to disintegrate, the Federal Republic would still have to try everything to keep the United States her closest ally. But a bilateral relationship with the United States might alienate West Germany from the rest of Europe, in the West as well as the East. Clearly, this would be tantamount to a peaceful Soviet victory over NATO.

IV

The American case against a radical change in the structure of the Western alliance has recently been restated by Secretary Rusk in response to French criticism of NATO. President DeGaulle has opposed the integration of NATO for a long time, because he believes, in the words he used on September 5, 1960 -- "that the defense of a country must have national character." His views on the Western alliance had been known well before 1960. In his celebrated memorandum to President Eisenhower of September 17, 1958, he urged Franco-American-British agreement on a common policy outside the North Atlantic area, in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere, with each of the three powers having a veto on the other. In the same memorandum he also sought control over the U. S. nuclear deterrent, suggesting that the United States should use nuclear weapons at its own discretion only if the U. S. were attacked directly, but that in all other situations French and British concurrence should be required. As to NATO, the memorandum of 1958 concluded that in the future French cooperation with its allies would be withheld unless France's global demands were met.¹

Eisenhower, in his reply of October 20, 1958, accepted the idea of broader consultation on world problems but insisted that such consultation be held with all members of NATO. Some such technical consultations were

¹The content of DeGaulle's memorandum, subsequent consultation and communication from 1958 to 1963 were described succinctly in two articles by James Reston in The New York Times of May 1 and 3, 1964; see also C. L. Sulzberger's commentary in The New York Times of March 18, 1963.

arranged. Consultations among the three Western powers for the purpose of preparing a common position on such problems as Laos and Berlin were agreed upon between DeGaulle and Kennedy after their meeting on June 2, 1961, but the French failed to respond when they were later requested to name a military representative for this purpose. Since DeGaulle did not attain his original objective of restricting U. S. sovereignty outside the NATO area by a French veto he proceeded step by step to contract his cooperation in NATO.

September 9, 1965, was the last occasion to date at which the President of France again distinguished the Atlantic alliance from NATO itself. In his view, the former serves the common security interest of European powers and the United States vis à vis the Soviet Union; the latter represents an unacceptable subordination of French sovereignty to U. S. domination. Since this press conference, French plans for the reform of NATO have not been further elucidated by DeGaulle in public, but the Paris edition of The New York Herald Tribune reported on September 21, 1965, quite specific wishes that DeGaulle had expressed to Under Secretary Ball in Paris. According to this source, the French President wants (1) to put the twenty-seven U. S. base installations in France under French commanders; these installations, which are vital for the functioning of the U. S. forces stationed in Germany, were established by bilateral agreement outside the NATO treaty; (2) to replace the integrated NATO installations and command arrangements by bilateral agreement; and (3) to abolish both the American command over

NATO forces and the integration of the relatively small French contingent in NATO. Despite official French denials of this report rumors persisted that it was substantially correct; besides, it contained nothing that conflicted with DeGaulle's previously known views.

Shortly thereafter, in the Autumn issue of Politique Etrangère, an anonymous article, titled "Faut-il réformer l'alliance atlantique?" advanced specific suggestions for the reform of NATO. The international press reported, this time without a French denial, that DeGaulle had read and approved this informal policy paper. The proposals for changes of NATO as well as the analysis of the current world balance of power again were highly critical of the principle of integration in NATO. The authors of the study assigned a merely symbolic value to the presence of U. S. troops in Europe. In a style of reasoning reminiscent of certain American intellectuals who write about war as though they were discussing traffic accidents, the authors asked a rhetorical question as to whether the U. S. government would not rather sacrifice the American troops stationed in Europe than expose the United States to nuclear destruction. At the same time the authors expressed confidence in U. S. willingness to protect American security interests in Europe.

Two systems, they said, should take the place of NATO, an old-fashioned western alliance that would include the United States, without integrated command, but with continuous coordination of the allied strategies of deterrence on a global scale; and a narrower, integrated, European defense system without the United States. In this latter system, until the day of reunification

the Federal Republic would have no voice in nuclear decisions, but would be given a nuclear guarantee by -- France. Evidently, the authors of this study felt that a French nuclear capability and its credibility would be regarded by both Germans and other Europeans as well as by the Soviet leaders with the respect that they were believed or invited to deny to American nuclear capabilities and commitments. In any event, the Federal Republic, correctly regarded as a purely European country, would be strictly subordinated to France, which, despite the emaciation of her power outside the metropolitan area, claims global status. A flippant satirist may think that the proposals provide the setting for a fable in which a rooster tries to outdo the dog in fighting the cat. Perhaps these proposals are but an opening gambit in negotiations about the future of NATO.

Be that as it may, in a press conference on November 5, Mr. Rusk said that he would not deal with the French position until President DeGaulle himself had made specific proposals. Then addressing himself to the question of integration in NATO he remarked:

We have a very substantial force in the heart of Europe -- if my friends in Europe would forgive me -- surrounded in a sea of foreigners.

Now integration is imposed upon us by the de facto situation. Our responsibility for the effectiveness and the security and the future of those forces in Europe is such that we need to know who is going to do what, when, and where, if there is trouble.

So that whatever one says in theory, we are integrated. Our forces are there in the heart of

Europe. So people must forgive us if we have a rather strong view on the subject of integration....
(underlining supplied)¹

Not all American students of NATO would fully understand and agree with Mr. Rusk. Prominent Americans, like Senator Douglas from Illinois, have advocated that the U. S. punish DeGaulle for his anti-American policy, but neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson has ever considered it prudent to trade insults with the General. There are other Americans who point to the need for correcting existing inequities in NATO. For example, Paul Findley, Republican Congressman from Illinois and Chairman of a Republican Study Group on NATO, as late as October 14, 1965, spoke of "the unnecessary predominance of the United States in NATO," and of the need to abolish the nuclear "caste system" in the Western alliance. Observing that of the 17 main commands in NATO seven are held by the United States (including SACEUR), 8 by Great Britain, and one each by France and Belgium, he advocated a more equitable distribution of commands among the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance. And observing that the French command of Central Europe is limited by SACEUR's prerogative to decide on the use of tactical nuclear weapons, he advocated that the United States renounce its veto over the use of such weapons.

It is not possible to predict the future of NATO, but it is necessary to be aware of the dangers that a reform of the Western alliance must try to avoid. As I have indicated it would be neither in the American interest

¹The New York Times, November 6, 1965.

nor in that of the Germans to replace the current structure of NATO by bilateral German-American security arrangements. Such arrangements would fortify opposition to West Germany not only in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also in Western and Northern Europe, Great Britain, and Canada. Moreover, the United States, rather than France, would appear as the architect of Western discord, who destroyed the house he had helped to build. In addition, the United States would be left in the end with a defense arrangement that would not be viable, for West Germany isolated in Europe could not serve as the mainstay of U. S. security interests on the continent.

Similarly, the continuation of NATO without France is most undesirable for all members of NATO, including France herself, since French political influence in the world, as well as her political influence on the development of the Common Market, would atrophy once isolated from NATO. For such policy to be viable France would need more than a Soviet support on which she could place no reliance. For example, could the Soviet Union be counted on to insure the French presence in West Berlin?

V

NATO is an alliance for the NATO area, but some of its member states -- today primarily the United States and Great Britain -- have vital security interests also outside that area. The United States has such interests in Latin America, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, as well as Europe. By contrast, West Germany's main political interests outside Europe are limited to relations with the so-called non-aligned countries, since it is

important to the Federal Republic that they do not recognize Ulbricht's regime. In addition, West Germany has an indirect, ambivalent interest in military conflicts outside the NATO area, primarily those in which the United States is involved.

On the one hand, the Germans, like other NATO allies, expect the United States to meet communist challenges wherever they may occur. The war in Korea testified in German eyes to the seriousness of the anti-communist commitment of the United States in Europe. So does today the American stand in Vietnam. And it would certainly take a strange twist of the imagination to deny that a failure to meet Khrushchev's challenge in Cuba would have caused dismay in Western Europe.

On the other hand, American participation in military conflicts outside the NATO area inevitably produces apprehensions in Europe. There is concern that war in Asia or Africa may dilute the U. S. commitment to Europe, that it may divert American military resources from Europe, or worse, that it may spread and engulf Europe in nuclear war.

Until about the middle '50's, as long as a Soviet attack on Europe was a matter of intense concern and all hope was placed in American nuclear weapons to equalize Soviet superiority in conventional arms, the fear of war in consequence of Soviet aggression easily turned into a fear of the weapon that would be employed in that war.¹ It could happen that

¹It may be recalled that in the early '50's, both Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles spoke of tactical atomic weapons as "conventional" arms.

in the eyes of some Europeans the responsibility for aggression appeared less important than the responsibility for the terrible, nuclear nature of the war. To put it paradoxically, what some Europeans feared at that time was not only reckless American policies that might plunge Europe into war, but also the credibility of the American commitment to come to Europe's help in the event of attack, because this help was bound to be nuclear. Today, there still is fear that the United States may drag Europe into an unwanted war because of American policies outside Europe. Thus in his election speech of November 30, President DeGaulle raised the specter of France's becoming involved in a war against her will.¹

Militarily NATO has grown stronger from year to year. During the past few years, while the political difficulties in NATO have been mounting, the increase in its military strength has been formidable. By the end of 1966 the stockpile of nuclear warheads in Western Europe will be twice as high as it was in 1961. There is less fear of Soviet aggression than there was in the early '50's. Western Europe has attained considerable economic strength, with the Federal Republic playing the leading role. France has become a minor nuclear power, the third in NATO. And yet the burden of the main European argument about the need for a reform of the alliance has not been that the need for American protection has weakened because of Europe's increased ability and willingness to contribute to her own security more than

¹The New York Times, December 1, 1965.

in the past. Instead, it has been argued that (1) Asia, rather than Europe, has become the primary theater of American political and military engagement; (2) the American commitment to Europe, and thus the deterrent, has become incredible, since the United States cannot be expected to expose New York, Chicago, or Washington to Soviet nuclear attack for the sake of Hamburg, Paris, or London; (3) given these two momentous changes on the international scene the United States and the Soviet Union are moving toward a new Yug in which the former might bow to the latter's interests in Europe at Germany's expense; and finally, (4) that urging the Europeans to help provide conventional options of defense does not add to, but detracts from, the deterrent, again signalling an American intention to dilute its commitment to Europe (despite the increase in tactical nuclear weapons).

While these views are not shared by the Federal Government, they have been expressed in West Germany by responsible critics, and since no one is able to eliminate the uncertainties attending any assessment of international affairs no one can afford to judge the merit of views deviating from his own by the lack of power their proponents wield in domestic politics. In my judgment, the critical views that I have mentioned are mistaken ones, and the real problems involving Germany and U. S. foreign policy must be differently stated.

It is true that in recent years U. S. policy has been increasingly pre-occupied with the war in Vietnam and that for various reasons European problems awaiting a solution have not been acted upon with the same sense of urgency. A decision on the divisive issue of the MLF was postponed by

President Johnson at the end of 1964. There has been no Western initiative on German reunification. Elections in the United States, the Federal Republic, and France have contributed to arresting the momentum of U. S. policy toward Europe. Domestic political issues have absorbed much of Washington's energy. But there has been no shift in the focus of American foreign policy from Europe to Asia. Whatever the meaning of "polycentrism," no communists have become friends of the West. Nor has the Sino-Soviet rift or the explosion of two Chinese nuclear devices turned Red China into an adversary of the United States more dangerous than the Soviet Union. Red China's GNP is about one-fourth that of the Soviet Union; military outlays are closer to the ratio of one to eight; and the Soviet Union, not China, has a large nuclear arsenal. For good reasons China has been even more cautious than the Soviet Union in the use of military power. At his meeting with Kennedy in Vienna Khrushchev said that "if he were Mao he would probably have attacked Taiwan long ago."¹ At present, the Sino-Soviet rift obliges all non-communist governments to consider the pros and cons of a differentiated diplomacy toward the Communist states, but it is not absolutely certain that the rift will outlast Mao's life. And assuming the persistence or deepening of this rift, it is quite possible that for a long time to come the Soviet Union rather than China will remain the principal adversary of the West in Asia as well as Europe.

¹ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, New York, 1965, p. 364.

Mr. Sorensen, a man who was especially close to President Kennedy, once observed that Kennedy "did not expect the (Western) Alliance to hold tight in Vietnam, the Congo, Cyprus, or similar side issues. (Emphasis added.) But he was determined to hold it together on any major confrontation with the Soviet Union."¹ There is no indication that President Johnson differs in this regard from President Kennedy.

Some observers seem to believe that Europe can afford to relax because the two "nuclear giants" have attained a balance of power or terror and reached a stand-off in Europe, so that the time has come for the allies to turn to differences in their own ranks without fear of inviting calamity. On both sides of the Atlantic the optimistic appraisers of the prospects of peace take lightly the fact that it was in allegedly stabilized conditions of the balance of power that Khrushchev embarked upon his provocative missile venture in Cuba. Moreover, the appraisers seem to regard Kennedy's and Khrushchev's behavior during the Cuban missile crisis as a natural way of resolving conflict without war, that is, as a method which can be followed at will in any future contingency by any leader.

It seems likely to me that serious future conflicts -- whether in Asia, Latin America, Europe, or elsewhere -- will recur. They cannot be wished away. They must be guarded against with vigilance and in unity. Dissension within the Western Alliance is, among other things, a sign that, for the time being,

¹Theodore C. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 564.

all is quiet on the European front, but let us beware that disarray in the rear be not a luxury that sometime in the future must be paid for at the front.

For two reasons all seems quiet in the frontiers of Western Europe at present. First, since the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis the communists have not exerted strong pressure on West Berlin. Nor have they confronted the West with ultimata aimed at Western recognition of the GDR. Instead, they concentrate their political attack on NATO, exploiting especially the sharp Western disagreement on nuclear issues within the alliance. At the moment it is by means of this concerted political attack that the governments of the communist camp (regardless of "polycentrism") present the Federal Republic as a menace to peace in Europe and as the obstacle to international agreement on halting the spread of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the Western powers fail to insist that the Soviet government concern itself anew with the reunification of Germany. At present, there does not seem to be a new Western plan for negotiating with the Soviet leaders a political termination of World War II in Europe. U. S. policy on German reunification and on the illegitimacy of the Ulbricht regime has not changed; it has been periodically and ritually reaffirmed. Furthermore, despite its lack of initiative on reunification since 1959, the U. S. government has made it clear that any attempt to Europeanize or de-Americanize the four-power responsibility for reunification must reckon with American resistance. Not that a broader European framework for settling

the issue has been rejected. On the contrary, many, though not all, views on this subject advanced by DeGaulle at his press conference on 9 September 1965, were expressed also by President Kennedy, for example, in his speech at the Free University of Berlin in June 1963. He said at that time that a united Europe on both sides of the Wall would provide the best chance for attaining German reunification. President Johnson has spoken along similar lines, and unless I am mistaken, many German politicians are of the same opinion. But the United States will not renounce its co-responsibility for German reunification. Nor would I think it prudent if concern with the broader issue of the relation between East and West Europe were used as an excuse for halting political thinking about the narrower issue of German reunification. Certainly, from the German point of view this narrower issue is the more pressing one of the two; it has to be faced squarely lest the impression of a growing indifference toward it lead to predictable gains of the communists, if not to unpredictable consequences in Germany.

Ever since Mr. Rusk's background briefing of December 1964, if not earlier, it has become clear that the United States preferred German suggestions regarding a Western negotiating position on reunification and on related questions, like European security and the frontier issues, to American initiative accompanied by German reluctance, not to mention German distrust and public criticism of U. S. efforts to explore with Soviet leaders the possibilities of a settlement.

Much more needs to be said on this subject than I can attempt to do in this context, but I shall confine myself to one observation. If re-unification really is the fourth most vital concern of West German foreign policy -- security, freedom, and peace being the first three -- then it seems to me that reunification and the issues associated with it should indeed be a principal area of German initiative in international affairs. Only by a contribution to the settlement of these issues can the Federal Republic hope to attain more freedom of action in foreign policy than it now enjoys. Remembering that reunification involves a change in the territorial status quo in Europe, it is to be hoped that there will be careful and realistic German appraisals of (1) the conditions in which the Soviet Union might accept specified western terms, and (2) the political price which the Federal Republic itself (and the other powers involved) would be willing and able to pay should these conditions fail to materialize.

In their appraisals German political planners will also have to take account of the subtle but important difference in the American stake in Berlin, on the one hand, and in reunification, on the other. The primary U. S. objective in Berlin is maintaining the status quo with its well-known three essentials -- allied presence, free access to the city, and political freedom of the West Berliners. The first two essentials are associated with

certain prerogatives in relation to the Federal Government and with obligations that bind the Soviet Union as well as the three Western powers. Russian and East German communist leaders want to change the territorial status quo of Berlin in defiance of the three essentials and of Soviet obligations. Regarding Germany as a whole, however, they want to maintain and fortify the status quo by persuading non-communist states to recognize the Ulbricht regime and the existing frontiers of Poland and the Soviet Union. In this regard, it is the Federal Republic that has a primary interest in changing the status quo: it wants reunification and not the sanctioning by international agreements of the communist three-state doctrine. The United States being more powerful than West Germany's other allies and being a non-European state, appreciates this German interest perhaps somewhat more fully or more easily than do the other NATO allies, but even so, it is undeniably less of a tragedy for Americans to live with the present division of Germany than it is for the Germans to do so. From the German point of view, it is therefore fortunate that the future of Berlin is so intimately associated with the future of Germany as a whole.

Finally, I am sure, political observers in the Federal Republic appreciate the fact that the United States cannot pursue any policy on German reunification that would jeopardize the remaining cohesion of NATO. The Alliance may not last in its present form beyond 1970, but it would be calamitous indeed if its decline were precipitated by a policy on reunification that the Federal Republic with the United States or both powers jointly

would wish to pursue against the strong objections of other allies, for example, Great Britain or France.

VI

Probably the deepest cause of discord in NATO is the nuclear issue. It has two main roots, nuclear inequality among the members of the alliance and the conflict between the objectives of deterrence and detente in Western policy.

The political repercussions of nuclear inequality in NATO were formidable enough, as long as the United States was the uncontested protector of West European security, but in consequence of the spread of national nuclear capacities in the alliance this inequality has become more rather than less of a political problem. The nuclear dwarfs in NATO, being militarily more powerful than the nuclear have-nots in the alliance, either wish to maintain an especially close relationship with the United States or, proud of being nuclear rather than conventional dwarfs, occasionally try to defy the United States. At the same time they endeavor to maintain whatever superiority of power or prestige their nuclear arsenals give them over the nuclear have-nots. And the United States has not been eager either to help its allies to develop their own nuclear capacities. The proliferation of nuclear weapons in NATO has accentuated inequalities in the alliance, and if, in the absence of a united Europe, national nuclear capability is made the touchstone of influence in the alliance there inevitably arises the political

dilemma of discrimination against the potential n+1 country in NATO. The Federal Republic is affected by this dilemma.

In 1954 it made a pledge to remain a non-nuclear power. The German commitment of 1954 not to produce any nuclear weapons is limited in several ways: it covers only production and not acquisition by other means, such as purchase; it pertains only to production on German soil; it does not preclude participation of the Federal Republic in bilateral or multilateral nuclear arrangements that stop short of giving Germany a nuclear capability of her own; and finally, the commitment was made only to West Germany's allies and not to governments of other countries, such as India, Egypt, or the Soviet Union. In September 1965, Mr. William C. Foster reminded the Soviet delegation at the end of the 18-nations conference on disarmament in Geneva that at present the Soviet Union has no legal basis from which to protest West German access to nuclear weapons, not to mention West German participation in a multilateral force; Soviet claims to the contrary notwithstanding, participation in a multilateral force would not necessarily give the Federal Republic such access.

Meanwhile the idea of a multilateral force has been withering on the vines of communist opposition, allied disunity, and -- since December 1964 -- greater American caution regarding the project. The intensity of the German interest in the arrangement -- overestimated for a long time by many Americans -- has weakened as well, as was evident in the recent debates of Dr. Erhard's government declaration in the Bundestag in November

1965. This does not mean, however, that the Federal Government can be expected to welcome seeing its pledge of 1954 turned into an instrument of allied discrimination against Germany. Nor would it be in the American interest to be indifferent toward such a turn of events, since it would give rise to justifiable German dissatisfaction.

The United States appreciates the German desire that any remaining discrimination against the Federal Republic within NATO be lessened. Indeed, it is desirable to establish among the members of the alliance as equitable a balance as possible of responsibilities and obligations, protection and risk, political influence and military contribution.

More serious than nuclear proliferation within the alliance has been the emergence and growth of nuclear capabilities in the communist camp. Directly and indirectly, nuclear proliferation outside NATO has had a considerable impact on the position of the Federal Republic. The growing Soviet nuclear capability has increased the possibilities that the Soviet Union may threaten the European NATO allies with nuclear blackmail as well as nuclear devastation. While the Federal Republic is as immune to blackmail as any other NATO ally as long as it can count on American protection, its vulnerability to physical attack is very great.

Furthermore, in conjunction with the Soviet long-range delivery capability, the nuclear might of the Soviet Union has led to mutual fear by the nuclear giants: the Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in avoiding nuclear war. In European eyes this common interest has sometimes been misrepresented to mean that detente has replaced deterrence

or that in the era of coexistence America's militant stand against communism has given way to a more conciliatory posture. There have even been irresponsible claims that the United States and the Soviet Union have developed a common interest in establishing a condominium in Europe. Fanciful as these conceits are in view of continued U. S. resistance to communism in Europe and elsewhere, given West Germany's non-nuclear status and the unsettled problem of reunification, the Federal Republic is understandably concerned about lasting American support of German military and political interests.

For several years, German concern over the U. S. policy of halting the spread of nuclear weapons has been particularly intense, since it is feared that an absorbing commitment to the goal of this policy may lead the United States to disregard German desires in order to attain formal agreement of the Soviet government on non-proliferation.

In my view, it is a moot issue, to say the least, whether the Soviet government is really interested in signing a non-proliferation agreement at this time. Fear of Chinese criticism of such an agreement may well be real obstacle to Soviet action, whereas Western talk about a multilateral force may have served merely as a convenient pretext for Soviet recalcitrance in the negotiations on a treaty.

From the point of view of the United States the crucial question is how to reconcile the American interest in halting the spread of nuclear weapons with that of solving the nuclear question in NATO. In the last

six to eight months three main U. S. positions on this moot question have emerged. They are not of equal importance in the U. S. government, but all of them have had adherents in the Executive and Legislative branches of the government. From the first position it is argued that reaching international agreement on halting the spread of nuclear weapons is a matter of such over-riding importance that the United States should be willing to sacrifice nuclear sharing with other NATO powers in order to obtain Soviet consent to a non-proliferation treaty. From the second position it has been stressed that preserving or restoring the solidarity of the alliance is an aim of U. S. policy that ought to be accorded a higher priority than agreement on a non-proliferation treaty; at least a way ought to be found to reconcile the two interests. An attempt of this sort was indeed made in the form of the American proposal tabled at Geneva last summer for a non-proliferation treaty that would not preclude the formation of a joint nuclear force in NATO. The third position, which has attracted attention more recently than the other two positions, may be described as a compromise, which it is hoped might satisfy both the Soviet Union and the Western allies, particularly the Federal Republic; in any event it buys time. From this position special importance is attached to Secretary McNamara's proposal for a "select" planning committee within the alliance on nuclear matters. The idea was first advanced at a NATO meeting in May 1965, as a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, an MLF. It would enable the Germans to participate in nuclear deliberations and would at the same time de-emphasize the controversial aspects of physical access to the weapons.

Some Americans have argued with such desperate seriousness on the overriding importance of concluding a treaty on non-proliferation that they have come close to creating the false impression that the possible spread of nuclear weapons to new countries is a peril greater than the present possession of nuclear arsenals by communist powers. Few men have spoken more eloquently on the dangers of proliferation than Senator Robert Kennedy.

On June 23, 1965, he declared on the floor of the Senate:

...we cannot allow the demands of day-to-day policy to obstruct our efforts to solve the problem of nuclear spread. We cannot wait for peace in Southeast Asia, which will not come until nuclear weapons have spread beyond recall. We cannot wait for a general European settlement, which has not existed since 1914.¹

Four months later, he voiced the same opinion even more desperately:

I do not care what progress we make, whether it be in education or poverty or housing, or even in Southeast Asia, in our relationships with Laos and Vietnam, or in the Middle East; if we do not find an answer to this problem, nothing else means anything. (Emphasis supplied.)²

Given the destructiveness of nuclear weapons no one will want to dismiss such statements as political rhetoric. Those who advocate subordinating all other tasks of U. S. foreign policy to the supreme task of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons mean exactly what they say and often do so for the most humane reasons. Their sense of responsibility for the future of mankind is born of the awe that U. S. control over the most

¹Congressional Record, 89th Congress, June 23, 1965, p. 14051.

²Ibid., October 13, 1965, p. 25900.

fearful destructive power in the history of the race has created. It has created guilt feelings, too, prompting many nuclear physicists in the post-war years to take passionate flights into political roles. It made President Kennedy feel greater satisfaction about the nuclear Test Ban Treaty than about any other accomplishment in the White House.¹ And it made his brother Robert declare in the Senate "our responsibility and duty to act is plain. For we were the first to discover and use the atom's secrets."²

Nuclear terror or guilt, along with a disinclination to look back into the more distant past -- the more distant past being un-American, as it were -- may also be causes of the failure to learn discouraging lessons on nuclear dissemination from history. In the American literature one looks in vain for careful comparisons of the proliferation of nuclear capabilities -- that has occurred and may unfortunately continue -- with earlier phases of modern industrialization. Today, we are in a period of nuclear policy that resembles in some regards that of mercantilism when advanced states tried to keep secret those skills and techniques which augmented economic and military power. But on all levels of technology in the past the means of production have in the longer run influenced the means of destruction in an ever larger geographical area. This lesson of history seems to be lost on many deliberations about the spread of nuclear weapons. Perhaps this

¹Theodore C. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 564.

²Congressional Record, October 13, 1965, p. 25890.

is so in part because the terrifyingly destructive use of nuclear technology preceded its peaceful application for constructive ends.

It is also noteworthy that American policy on halting nuclear proliferation by a general -- preferably worldwide -- treaty, rather than by specific -- preferably bilateral and multilateral -- arrangements has had predictable repercussions on the global balance of power. Today, it is no longer politically useful to divide the world into nuclear and non-nuclear countries. It is more realistic to distinguish between (1) the five powers that have nuclear arsenals (although the present inferiority of China and France -- and to a lesser extent Great Britain -- to the two nuclear giants must not be disregarded); (2) the aspirant powers, that is the eight to ten powers that are most likely candidate members of the nuclear group of nations; and (3) those pre-industrial countries which are likely to remain have-not powers for a very long time, if not forever.

Now the international debates on non-proliferation have shown that in addition to the cold-war division of the world, the East-West split, and the juxtaposition of the advanced and the underdeveloped countries, often referred to as the North-South division, a third alignment cutting across the former two divisions may be emerging. For a basis of possible common interest exists among the nuclear aspirant powers leading the other nuclear have-nots against the haves. This was expressed most pointedly by Mr. Trivedi of India at the 99th meeting of the U. N. Disarmament Commission on June 14, 1965, when he said -- in my view with a touch of political naïveté:

Just as in the economic field we want the have-nots to be gradually assisted by economic advancement to assume the status of haves, in the matter of disarmament we want the haves gradually to become, in a contrary direction, have-nots.

Similarly, at the Geneva Conference last year the American delegation encountered difficulties not only with the Russians, but also with the Indians, the Swedes, the Italians, and in a different context, with the Canadians and British.

The arguments against the U. S. position on non-proliferation were advanced without regard to the continued anti-communist role of the United States in the East-West conflict, but they were not entirely without foundation. For example, Mr. William C. Foster, the chief U. S. delegate in Geneva, had not confined himself to setting forth the humane arguments favoring a worldwide agreement on non-proliferation, but in his celebrated article had frankly admitted that Americans "should not lose sight of the fact that widespread nuclear proliferation could mean a substantial erosion in the margin of power which our great wealth and industrial base have long given us relative to much of the rest of the world."¹

In Germany, the attack against the U. S. policy was waged most intemperately by Dr. Adenauer, on August 19, 1965; in the election campaign his views were echoed widely by his friends and even his critics. It was a generally pro-American weekly that commented:

¹William C. Foster, "New Directions in Arms Control and Disarmament," Foreign Affairs, July 1965, p. 591.

An atomic treaty, that would not be signed anyway by China, France, probably Indonesia and several other states, that would be imposed upon third nations with moral pressure and that would finally solidify the privileges of the atomically armed powers -- such a 'limited non-proliferation' could accelerate the decline of the Western Alliance without leading at the same time to an erosion of the Eastern coalition.¹

Another German newspaper spoke of "the solidarity of accomplices (Komplicenschaft) of the atomic have-not powers" as "an answer to the solidarity of accomplices among the powers possessing nuclear weapons."²

Distinguished West German politicians have repeatedly claimed that the commitment made in 1954 was the first promise given by the government of any non-nuclear state not to participate in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is literally true, though somewhat disingenuous, because in 1954 the Federal Government was concerned with Germany's political come-back, her military security, and her acceptability as a member of the Western family of nations; at the time it was not concerned with halting the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, Foreign Minister Schröder, of course, stayed within the bounds of Germany's international obligations when he observed in July 1965 that the Federal Republic would not sign a general non-proliferation agreement, unless it was accompanied by progress on the issue of German reunification, and that West Germany could renounce to her

¹Die Zeit, August 13, 1965.

²Die Welt, August 25, 1965; see also the article by Kurt Becker in Die Welt, August 23, 1965.

allies acquisition of nuclear weapons only if she were protected against the more than 700 Soviet MRBM's by the creation of a multilateral Atlantic deterrent force or by an equivalent arrangement.

It is another question whether or not it still is politically prudent of any German politician, no matter how distinguished he may be by virtue of advanced age or accomplishment, to assert German national interests in conjunction with an issue of arms control on which the communists and Germany's western allies may come to stand on common ground. It may be recalled that President Kennedy intimated to Mr. Adzhubei in December 1961 that the United States and the Soviet Union shared an interest in Germany's non-nuclear status; and in 1963, during the test ban negotiations in Moscow, the President instructed Ambassador Harriman not only to insist that the MLF was designed to prevent nuclear proliferation, but also "to explore without assurances whether our U. S. standing still on that project would help the Russians with the Chinese."¹

At the present time (January 1966) the idea of a multilateral force no longer commands much attention. This may change again, since the future cannot be safely predicted. But at this time a different way has been chosen to demonstrate American interest in avoiding discrimination against the Federal Republic. Germany has become one of the five members in the important strategic subcommittee of Mr. McNamara's no longer so

¹ Theodore C. Sorensen, op. cit., p. 736.

"selec." committee, no less than 10 NATO nations now being represented on it. In addition, American-German cooperation in space ventures was agreed upon by Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson in December 1965.

The future will tell whether these two arrangements will satisfy German desires for political non-discrimination and help to remove the obstacles to a viable policy on halting the spread of nuclear weapons. It remains to be seen whether the nuclear inequality in NATO can be politically de-emphasized. Much will depend on the nature of the issues to be discussed in the strategic subcommittee. If disunity and rivalry arising from nuclear inequality are to be mastered, inter-allied discussions in committees may not suffice to solve problems that are so intimately associated with physical arrangements. But such discussions may clarify the issues and, to repeat, they may buy time for the decisions that matter.